Global M2 is expanding. The Iran energy shock transmitted into Eurozone inflation at 3.2% in May, with energy costs running at 10.9% year-on-year. The ECB could no longer hold. What followed on 11 June was the downstream consequence of macro conditions visible before the major institutional real estate outlooks for 2026 were updated.

The documents being circulated right now were written in a rate environment that no longer exists.

"The ECB has brought inflation back to 2% and is expected to keep its policy rate there."

ING European Outlook — written before 11 June 2026

"Easing monetary policy and stabilising inflation are creating a favourable investment environment."

Cushman and Wakefield — written before 11 June 2026

Both are still being used to make acquisition and underwriting decisions. The ECB hiked because Eurozone inflation reached 3.2% in May, well above the 2% target, with at least one more hike expected before year end. The assumption these outlooks were built on has been invalidated.

Spain · Euribor Transmission

12-month Euribor (May 2026) 2.804%
12-month Euribor (January 2026) 2.25%
Funcas projection through 2026 Close to 2.8%
Consensus thesis assumption Further ECB cuts — invalidated

In Spain, the 12-month Euribor reached 2.804% in May 2026, up from 2.25% at the start of the year, with Funcas projecting it staying close to 2.8% through the rest of 2026. The Spain recovery consensus was built on the explicit assumption of further ECB rate cuts filtering through to lower Euribor. The ECB hiked instead, and the rate environment has moved in the opposite direction.

Germany · Short and Long End Signals

GDP Q1 2026 +0.3%
10-year Bund 11-year high
2-year Schatz (year-on-year move) +76 basis points to 2.60%
Loan growth direction Decelerating before June 11

In Germany, GDP grew 0.3% in Q1 2026. The 10-year Bund reached an 11-year high while the 2-year Schatz moved to 2.60%, up 76 basis points year-on-year. The short end was pricing ECB tightening before the hike landed and continuing to price further tightening after it. Loan growth was decelerating throughout. The credit availability recovery thesis was built on a financing environment that was already tightening before June 11.

England · BoE and Mortgage Market

Bank of England base rate (18 June hold) 3.75%
BoE vote split 7 hold, 2 for rise to 4%
Average 2-year fixed mortgage (early March) 4.83%
Average 2-year fixed mortgage (June) 5.73%
Rightmove June asking price move Biggest June drop in 14 years
Savills 2026 forecast revision +2% revised to -2%

In England the Bank of England sets rates independently of the ECB, but the same upstream macro cause is driving the same outcome through a different mechanism. The Iran energy shock transmitted into persistent UK inflation as directly as it did in the Eurozone. The BoE held at 3.75% on 18 June with two members voting for a rise to 4%. UK mortgage rates moved through swap market expectations, with the average two-year fixed rate rising from 4.83% in early March to 5.73%. Rightmove recorded the biggest June asking price drop in 14 years. Savills revised its 2026 forecast from positive 2% to negative 2%. The recovery narrative assumed falling rates. The macro conditions invalidated that assumption.

Three markets, one regime shift, and the annual outlooks still circulating were written before it arrived.

If the investment thesis you are working from was written before 11 June, it was written in a different rate environment. The question is whether you know which assumptions have since been invalidated.